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There are very large literatures in public health and economics on the effects of workplace smoking
bans, with most studies relying on cross-sectional variation.  We provide new quasi-experimental evidence
on the effects of workplace bans by using the differential timing of adoption of over 100 very strong
local smoking by-laws in Ontario, Canada over the period 1997-2004.  We employ restricted-use repeated
cross section geocoded outcome data to estimate reduced form models that control for demographic
characteristics, year fixed effects, and county fixed effects.  We first show that the effects of the local
laws on actual worksite smoking policy (i.e. the "first stage") were not uniform; specifically, local
laws were only effective at increasing ban presence among blue collar workers.  Among blue collar
workers, adoption of a local by-law significantly reduced the fraction of worksites without any smoking
restrictions (i.e. where smoking is allowed anywhere at work) by over half.  The differential effect
of local policies also improved health outcomes: we find that adoption of a local by-law significantly
reduced SHS exposure among blue collar workers by 25-30 percent, and we confirm that workplace
smoking laws reduce smoking.  We find plausibly smaller and insignificant estimates for white collar
and sales/service workers -- the vast majority of whom worked in workplaces with privately initiated
smoking bans well before local by-laws were adopted.  Overall our findings advance the literature
by confirming that workplace smoking bans reduce smoking, documenting the underlying mechanisms
through which local smoking by-laws improve health outcomes, and showing that the effects of these
laws are strongly heterogeneous with respect to occupation.
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California recently became the first state to classify secondhand smoke (SHS) as a toxic air 
pollutant, with potentially wide ranging policy implications.  This recent activity, however, is 
part of a much more longstanding trend in recognizing the potential health risks associated with 
SHS.  One of the most important ways this sentiment has been exhibited in the US is though the 
steady increase in restrictions on smoking at private worksites: by 1999 almost 70 percent of 
adult workers reported the presence of a complete work area smoking ban (Shopland et al. 2001).  
A large literature in the US has examined the effects of these workplace restrictions: multiple 
reviews of the evidence find that workplace smoking bans are associated with reduced exposure 
to secondhand smoke (SHS) and lower rates of own smoking and per capita cigarette 
consumption (Fichtenberg and Glantz 2002, Levy and Friend 2003, Brownson et al. 2002, and 
others). 
  An increasingly common policy tool aimed at achieving these improved outcomes is the 
adoption of local laws requiring smoke-free workplaces.  These policies are widespread in the 
US: as of 2005, 328 municipalities have adopted 100% smokefree workplace laws (Americans 
for Nonsmoker’s Rights 2006), and if one includes less restrictive policies the number of smoke-
free ordinances is well over 1000 (Brownson et al. 2002).  Moreover, the trend in adoption of 
local ordinances has been steadily upward, a phenomenon that has also occurred across Canada.  
Although a handful of US states and Canadian provinces have recently adopted tough 100% 
smoke-free workplace laws, it has been hypothesized that adoption of local laws may engender 
stronger community support than larger scale efforts, thereby increasing compliance (Levy and 
Friend 2003). 
Previous public health research on the effects of these local policies generally follows a 
cross-locality research design, in which outcomes (smoking, SHS exposure) for residents of How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 2  
 
cities with smoking by-laws are compared to outcomes for residents in untreated areas.  These 
studies typically find that individuals living in cities and towns with strong local ordinances have 
better outcomes than otherwise similar individuals living in areas without such policies or with 
weaker policies.  These cross-locality research designs may be problematic, however, if there 
exist unobserved characteristics about people that are correlated both with the decision to adopt a 
smoking ordinance and with individual preferences regarding smoke-free worksites and/or own 
smoking behavior.  Since the usual set of control variables available to researchers in the datasets 
used in these studies is fairly limited, these biases generally cannot be ruled out.  In this paper we 
revisit the effects of local smoking policies by using a quasi-experimental research design 
applied to the case of Ontario, Canada – the most populated province in that country – over a 
period of rapid and widespread adoption of local smoking by-laws.  In so doing, our goal is to 
provide new evidence on the effects of local smoking ordinances on actual ban presence, 
secondhand smoke exposure, and own smoking outcomes. 
Our study makes several distinct contributions to the existing literature.  First, we provide 
direct estimates of the extent to which local workplace smoking by-laws actually affect reported 
work ban presence.  While this may seem obvious, a review of the literature suggests this is not 
the case: very little of the public health research and none of the economics studies on this topic 
examine actual compliance by worksites.
1  Since a necessary condition for these local ordinances 
to improve health outcomes is that they must be adopted by worksites, this is an independently 
worthwhile endeavor.  Indeed, local by-laws might not translate into increased worksite policies 
because of lack of compliance or enforcement.  Our data on worksite smoking policies allow us 
to evaluate whether local by-laws mainly affect the extensive margin (by increasing the 
                                                 
1 Notable exceptions are Pierce et al. (1994) and Moskowitz et al. (2000).  Both of these studies use a cross-sectional 
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likelihood of reporting any workplace smoking restriction) or intensive margin (by increasing the 
intensity or strength of existing workplace smoking bans). 
Second, our analysis of local smoking ordinances explicitly accounts for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity through the inclusion of county fixed effects.  Most previous research 
either does not control at all for area effects or does so at a much broader level (e.g. state).  In 
this respect, our use of a well-accepted two-way fixed effects methodology marks a notable 
improvement over much of the previous literature in public health and economics on local clean 
indoor air laws. 
Third, this study is – to our knowledge – the first to consider the effects of smoking 
ordinances separately by white collar and blue collar occupations.  Although it has been 
previously documented that blue collar workers have poorer SHS and own smoking outcomes 
compared to white collar workers (see, for example, Wortley et al. 2002, and Gerlach et al. 
1997), the existing literature on this topic is almost entirely descriptive in nature.  Our results 
uncover the first evaluative evidence that local smoking ordinances were especially effective at 
improving outcomes for blue collar workers and essentially ineffective at improving outcomes 
for other types of workers.
2 
Finally, our research design allows us to provide complementary evidence on the 
important question of whether workplace smoking bans reduce smoking.  Although most data 
sources show a large negative cross-sectional relationship between the presence of a work area 
smoking ban and individual smoking participation, there are reasons to be skeptical that those 
                                                 
2 Our study also offers one of the first large scale analyses of the effects of smoking bans in Canada.  Although a 
handful of Canadian studies have considered sector-specific (e.g. office buildings), single-site, or single-city 
evaluations in cities in Canada, it is not obvious that those results generalize more broadly (Broder et al. 1993, 
Hammond et al. 2004).  The general paucity of Canadian studies is notable given that workplace smoking 
restrictions have proliferated in the country in the past decade and given the enormous growth of the US-focused 
literature. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 4  
 
single equation estimates reflect true causal effects (e.g. unobserved factors that may be 
correlated with both smoking decisions and workplace characteristics).  Previous research has 
attempted to deal with this problem by using firm characteristics as instruments for workplace 
smoking bans and finds very little evidence of an omitted variables bias (Evans et al. 1999).  Our 
use of the differential timing of adoption of local smoking by-laws provides an interesting 
complementary way to estimate whether plausibly exogenous variation in workplace smoking 
bans generated by these local by-laws is associated with predictable declines in smoking 
participation. 
Our analyses use restricted-use repeated cross section data from the 1997-2004 CAMH 
Monitor (formerly the Ontario Adult Drug Monitor).  These data provide information on 
individual outcomes both before and after the implementation of over 100 local smoking by-laws 
within Ontario.  Importantly, these data also identify the respondent’s detailed location of 
residence, which we use to match the local smoking restrictions to the individual observations.  
Our preferred approach estimates the effects of local smoking restrictions in the presence of 
controls for demographic characteristics, survey year dummies, and county fixed effects. 
To preview, we find that adoption of local smoking bans in Ontario significantly 
increased reported ban presence.  In the full sample, a local by-law is estimated to increase the 
likelihood of reporting a complete work area ban by about seven percent.  We also find large 
estimated reductions in the likelihood of reporting that smoking is allowed “anywhere” at work 
(i.e. no workplace restrictions).  These aggregate effects, however, mask important differences 
associated with occupation.  Specifically, the effects of by-laws on ban presence are driven 
entirely by blue collar workers.  Among blue collar workers we find that adoption of a local by-
law cuts the likelihood of reporting no workplace policy by about half and increases complete How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 5  
 
ban presence by about 25 percent.  We also find a significant reduction in SHS exposure of about 
25-30 percent and a large estimated reduction in own-smoking rates for blue collar workers.  
Importantly, our estimates for outcomes of white collar and sales/service workers – whose 
worksites were much more likely to have privately initiated smoking bans in the pre-reform 
period – are plausibly smaller and statistically insignificant. 
Taken together, our results confirm the beneficial effects of local clean indoor air laws – 
and by implication workplace smoking bans – on respiratory health but uncover substantial 
occupation-related heterogeneity in their effects.  From a policy perspective, this suggests that 
recent movements toward occupation-specific bans focusing on bars and restaurants may have 
overlooked factories and warehouses as equally important targets of reform.  And from a 
methodological standpoint, our results are important because they provide initial insight into the 
potential effects of a province-wide smoking ban that went into effect in Ontario in 2006.  Since 
other states and provinces have similarly adopted wide ranging smoking ordinances, it is 
particularly important to understand extent to which pre-existing local by-laws have already 
improved worker outcomes.  Failing to do so could result in biased estimates of the effects of 
state or province-wide policies. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides a brief review of relevant literature.  
In Section III we present the data and outline the empirical approach, and Section IV offers the 
main results.  Section V concludes. 
 
II. Previous Research 
A very large body of economics and public health literature has considered the effects of 
workplace smoking bans.  In fact, multiple reviews of the literature have been published in the How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 6  
 
past 5 years.  These reviews generally focus on the effects of smoking bans on smoking behavior 
and SHS exposure (see, for example, Fichtenberg and Glantz 2002, Levy and Friend, 2003, and 
Brownson et al. 2002).  An example is Evans et al. (1999) who use multiple US sources of data 
on privately initiated workplace smoking bans in the early 1990s and find a strong negative 
relationship between a workplace smoking ban and smoking participation and intensity.  To 
address concerns about unobserved third factors such as preferences for risk or health that may 
bias the cross-sectional relationships, these researchers use firm size as an instrumental variable 
and find that the IV estimates of the effect of smoking bans on own-smoking are slightly larger 
than the OLS estimates, suggesting a causal effect of bans at reducing smoking. 
Most economics research on the effects of smoking bans, however, considers the effects 
of public policies that restrict smoking in various settings.  Wasserman et al. (1991), for 
example, use several waves of the National Health Interview Survey from 1970-1985 and append 
state smoking regulations to the individual level data.  They control for a state-specific index that 
is larger if smoking is restricted in private worksites and smaller if smoking is restricted, say, 
only in restaurants or elevators.  Results indicated that higher state smoking restrictions were 
negatively related to tobacco consumption.  Keeler et al. (1993) also control for a local smoking 
regulations index in California that adjusted for exposure in a manner similar to the Wasserman 
et al. study; they also find some evidence that local ordinances reduced cigarette consumption.  
Chaloupka (1992) uses data from NHANES II and controls for the extent of workplace smoking 
restrictions at the state level.  He finds that state clean indoor air laws are associated with lower 
cigarette consumption, with results driven mostly by males.  Yurkeli and Zhang (2004) use state 
panel data on cigarette sales in the US from 1970-1995 and control for clean indoor air laws 
through the use of an index similar in spirit to those described above.  Tauras (2005) applies a How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 7  
 
similar framework to microdata from the Tobacco Use Supplements of the Current Population 
Survey over the period 1992-1999.  Importantly, both Yurkeli and Zhang (2004) and Tauras 
(2005) include unrestricted state and year fixed effects, and both find that the clean indoor air 
laws are significantly and negatively related to cigarette consumption. 
  Nearly all public health research on this topic uses a cross-locality research design to 
study the effects of local smoking restrictions.  Moskowitz et al. (2000), for example, use a 
single cross section of the 1990 California Tobacco Survey and append independently coded data 
on the strength of local workplace ordinances.  They find that, among individuals who were 
smokers or who had smoked in the 6 months prior to the survey, residents in areas with strong 
ordinances were significantly more likely to report the existence of a worksite smoking policy 
and to report quitting behavior compared to residents of areas with no local ordinance.  Emont et 
al. (1992) perform a similar exercise using variation in the strength of state level restrictions and 
the 1989 Cardiovascular Disease Supplement to the Current Population Survey.  They find that 
residents of states with more restrictive laws had lower cigarette consumption and higher quit 
rates than residents of states with less restrictive laws. 
  There is much less research on the effects of smoking laws in Canada.  Stephens et al. 
(1997) used a cross-sectional data set of Canadian residents in different provinces and compared 
residents in areas with “extensive” and “weak” coverage of smoking by-laws in 1990/91; they 
found that individuals in extensive coverage areas had 21 percent lower odds of being a current 
smoker compared to individuals in areas with weak coverage.
3  Another recent Canadian study 
                                                 
3 That study, however, included any municipal by-law that restricted smoking.  Indeed, their by-law data show that 
fully 76% of Ontario residents were covered by a municipal by-law that restricted smoking as of 1991.  It is likely 
that these included much less extensive restrictions such as Toronto’s 1970’s law that banned smoking in elevators, 
escalators, and service line-ups.  Our approach, in contrast, focuses only on by-laws with substantial worksite 
smoking restrictions.  As indicated by independent data from the Ontario Tobacco Action Network (described 
below), these did not proliferate across Ontario until the late 1990s. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 8  
 
used a telephone survey of former smokers in Waterloo, Ontario and information on the timing 
of when they quit smoking to assess whether the city’s smoke-free by-law played any role in 
helping smokers quit (Hammond et al. 2004).  Using self-reported assessments of the importance 
of the smoke-free by-law, the researchers conclude that more stringent smoke-free policies “were 
associated with a greater impact upon motivations to quit.” 
  To summarize, there is a large body of evidence on the question of whether smoking bans 
improve worker outcomes and on the effects of clean indoor air legislation.  Our study differs 
from the previous literature in the following ways: 1) we are most interested in tough 100% 
completely smoke-free local by-laws as opposed to less restrictive policies pertaining to other 
public spaces; 2) unlike the majority of the economics studies, we consider only consider local 
laws, which allows us to abstract away from prices and policies that vary at the broader state or 
provincial level (e.g. cigarette taxes); 3) unlike the public health literature on local smoking laws, 
we explicitly account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity through inclusion of county 
fixed effects; 4) we are explicitly interested in the “first stage” relationship between smoking 
laws and actual reported worksite smoking policies; and 5) we provide the first estimates of the 
effects of local by-laws and smoking bans by broad occupation group.
4 
 
III. Data Description and Empirical Approach 
Our outcome data come from restricted use versions of the 1997-2004 CAMH Monitor.  The 
CAMH monitor is a telephone survey administered throughout the calendar year.  These data are 
repeated cross sections of approximately 2300 adults in Ontario each year and contain detailed 
                                                 
4 Again, we note that others have previously investigated the role of occupation, though not in an evaluative context.  
Wortley et al. (2002), for example, found heightened serum cotinine levels – a biological marker of SHS exposure – 
among operators, fabricators, and laborers.  Gerlach et al. (1997) find that construction trades workers, fabricators, How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 9  
 
geographic information on the respondent’s residence as measured by the first three characters of 
the individual’s self-reported postal code.  The CAMH monitor also includes standard 
demographic characteristics for all respondents, such as: age, sex, marital status, and education.  
We control for these demographic characteristics in the regression models below. 
  In each year a subset of the core sample was asked a set of questions about tobacco 
policy, including smoking restrictions at their workplace.  Individuals are first asked whether 
they work outside the home, and if so what the smoking restrictions are at their place of work.
5  
Specifically, respondents are asked, “Which of the following statements describes the policy on 
smoking where you work?  One: Smoking is allowed anywhere.  Two: There are smoking areas 
indoors.  Three: Smoking is only allowed outside.  Or Four: Smoking is not allowed at all.  Not 
allowed at all means no smoking on company property, both indoors and outdoors.”  We first 
define an outcome called No Workplace Policy equal to one if the individual reports that 
smoking is allowed anywhere and zero otherwise.  This outcome is meant to asses whether local 
ordinances affect the extensive margin by inducing some worksites with no workplace policy to 
adopt some nontrivial restriction.  We next create an indicator called Ban Presence equal to one 
if the individual reports that smoking is completely banned on company property or if smoking is 
only allowed outside and zero otherwise.
6  Finally, we use the range of responses described 
above to create a simple index called Ban Range that equals 1 if smoking is allowed anywhere at 
                                                                                                                                                             
machine operators, and mechanics had some of the lowest smoke-free workplace coverage in the 1992/93 Tobacco 
Use Supplements to the Current Population Surveys. 
5 Later in the survey adults are also asked about their detailed labor force status, including: full-time or part-time job, 
sick leave, unemployed, retired, homemaker, student, or self-employed.  We restrict attention to full-time workers, 
part-time workers, and those who say they have a job but are currently away from it (for example because of sick 
leave or vacation). 
6 Because the response options in the CAMH monitor are slightly different than associated options in US data (such 
as the National Health Interview Survey), our “Ban Presence” outcome should most closely be thought of as a 
complete “work area smoking ban” such as those used by Evans et al. (1999).  Note also that most US data sources 
only ask the workplace smoking restriction question to those who work indoors; there is no such sample restriction How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 10  
 
work, 2 if there are smoking areas indoors, and so forth.  Throughout, we assume that 
respondents report their current workplace smoking policy.  This seems warranted given the 
wording of the question. 
Individuals are also asked about exposure to secondhand smoke at their place of work.  
Specifically, individuals are asked: “In the last week, how many days were you exposed to other 
people’s [emphasis added] tobacco smoke while you were at work?  By exposed, I mean 
spending at least 5 minutes in an area where someone is smoking.”  We create an outcome 
variable called No SHS equal to one if the respondent reports zero days of exposure to SHS at 
work and zero otherwise.  We also create a variable called Daily SHS Exposure that equals one if 
the respondent reports exposure to other people’s SHS on 5 or more days in the last week.  Our 
use of self-reported days of exposure is supported by previous research which demonstrates that 
these self-reported outcomes are strongly correlated with other biological markers of 
environmental tobacco smoke such as ambient nicotine measurements (Coghlin et al. 1989).
7  
Finally, we use information on the respondent’s own smoking behavior to create a dummy 
variable indicating the respondent is a Current Smoker.
8 
Our local workplace smoking restriction data are publicly available and come from a 
publication entitled “Municipal Smoke-Free Bylaws in Ontario” from the Ontario Campaign for 
Action on Tobacco (www.ocat.org).  This organization tracks the implementation dates of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
used in the CAMH monitor.  If anything, this should bias us against finding effects, since individuals who should 
plausibly not be affected by the local ordinances are unfortunately included in the sample. 
7 Importantly, the CAMH monitor question on SHS exposure provides a specific, objective outcome measure of 
SHS exposure that does not require knowledge about the official smoking policy at the worksite.  That is, even 
individuals responding that they did not know the policy on smoking at their worksite gave valid responses to 
questions about SHS exposure. This marks a notable improvement of the CAMH monitor over other similar data 
sources in the US such as the Tobacco Supplements to the Current Population Survey, which only asks the questions 
about SHS exposure to those who report the presence of an official workplace smoking policy.  Since it is possible 
that one might detect the effects of a ban on reported SHS exposure but not ban presence, the CAMH monitor 
questions are likely preferred.  In practice, however, the number of “don’t know” responses to the question about 
workplace smoking policy is too small to have substantive effects on our estimates.   How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 11  
 
local bylaws in Ontario and also indicates whether the ordinance permits Designated Smoking 
Rooms (DSRs) or requires 100% compliance with smoke-free areas.  We match the localities 
covered by workplace smoking bans in the OCAT according to the geographic residence 
information provided in the CAMH monitor, and we create a variable called Workplace By-Law 
that equals one if the individual’s residence is covered by a local ordinance that requires 
workplaces to be 100% smoke-free and zero otherwise. 
Our main empirical approach is two-way fixed effects, in which the change in outcomes 
(ban presence, days of SHS exposure, and own smoking behavior) of individuals living in ban-
adopting areas around the time of ban implementation are compared to the associated changes in 
outcomes for otherwise similar individuals living in areas in Ontario that did not adopt a ban at 
the same time.  The key identifying assumption in this model is that there were no other shocks 
at the same time of the implementation of the ban that differentially affected outcomes.  This 
difference-in-differences approach addresses unobserved area-specific heterogeneity through the 
inclusion of county fixed effects. 
We implement the basic model by estimating the following reduced form regression on 
the sample of adults who report working outside the home and have no missing data on the 
demographic characteristics or outcome variables: 
(1) Y = α + β1 X + β2 (Local Workplace By-Law) + County + Survey Year + ε 
where Y refers to the various outcomes described above.  We use linear probability models 
(LPM) for the dichotomous outcomes for simplicity.
9  X is a vector of demographic information 
that includes: age, sex, marital status (3 categories), and education (4 categories).  Area is a 
vector of dummies for either postal code, county, or region (depending on the model), while 
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Survey Year is a vector of survey year dummies.  Local Workplace By-Law is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a place covered by a relevant local smoking law.  
The coefficient of interest, β2, captures the effect of the local bans as measured by the change in 
outcomes for individuals living in the treated areas relative to the associated change in outcomes 
for individuals living in non-treated areas.  All models use the sampling weights provided by the 
CAMH monitor, and we cluster standard errors by county (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004).
10 
Note that our baseline model includes county fixed effects as opposed to, say, postal code 
or region.
11  Although such models produced similar results, our focus on county derives from 
the fact that it is the most common sub-provincial level at which health policies such as 
workplace smoking by-laws are set in Ontario.  Although some small towns adopted 100% 
smoke-free ordinances, the large share (70%) of our Workplace By-Law indicator is composed 
of ordinances set at the county level.  Of course, we still make use of the postal code information 
to account for the handful of towns and large cities at the sub-county level that also adopted 
smoke-free ordinances (e.g. Windsor) but that would not be appropriately captured by a county-
specific algorithm.  Unfortunately, “cities” and “towns” – unlike counties – are not identified in 
the CAMH monitor.  Although we could aggregate postal codes to create such measures, this 
would be incomplete and subjective.  Finally, information on postal code is missing for 
approximately two percent of the sample; in contrast, we observe the county for each respondent. 
One limitation of the data in the context of evaluating the effects of local smoking by-
laws is that the CAMH monitor identifies the location of the respondent’s residence, not the 
                                                 
10 Note that for the model predicting smoking status we do not control for other tobacco policies such as cigarette 
excise taxes.  These policies generally vary at the provincial (as opposed to county) level.  We assume such policies 
affect all Ontario residents equally. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 13  
 
location of work.  This is a common problem in evaluations such as ours – including all the 
related public health literature cited above – and there is little we can do to correct for this 
slippage.  If home/work travel patterns in Ontario are similar to those for its neighbors in the 
United States, however, this is unlikely to seriously bias our estimates; almost three quarters of 
adults in the United States live and work in the same county (US Census Bureau 2006).  We 
provide a map of Ontario and its county borders in Figure 1.
12 
  Another data issue worth noting is that that the questions about workplace bans and SHS 
exposure were only asked of a random subset of respondents in each year.  Because of this, we 
can only estimate the effect of local bans on reported ban presence and SHS exposure for a 
subset of the CAMH respondents.  In contrast, the questions about own smoking behavior were 
asked of all adults.  If we are willing to assume that the effect of the local bans on reported ban 
presence is the same for the respondents who were not asked the questions about workplace 
smoking restrictions – as seems reasonable – then we can still estimate the reduced form effect of 
local policy adoption on own smoking outcomes for the entire sample and benefit from the 
increased precision afforded by having essentially twice as many observations as for the analyses 




                                                                                                                                                             
11 Technically, Ontario’s “counties” are a combination of counties, districts, regional municipalities, and other 
governmental designations.  Throughout, however, we use the “county’ variable in the CAMH monitor data. 
12 We do not know the associated figure for Ontario because county identifiers are not available in the public use 
versions of the Canadian Census.  As in the US, there is substantial heterogeneity in the size of Ontario counties.  To 
provide a sense of this, note that 90% of Ontario’s land area but only about 7% of its population is represented in the 
Northern part of the province.  In Southern Ontario, counties are smaller and more densely populated.  Toronto, 
Ontario’s most populated city, covers about 700 square kilometers; its surrounding municipalities are York (1760 
km
2), Peel (1240 km
2), and Durham (2500 km
2).  As a point of comparison, the average land area of the 83 counties 
in Michigan (Ontario’s US neighbor to the west and south) is about 1,700 km
2. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 14  
 
We present descriptive statistics for the main sample and separately by the presence of a local 
workplace smoking by-law in Table 1.
14  The patterns suggest that localities adopting by-laws 
are somewhat different from non-adopters: individuals living in areas covered by a workplace 
by-law are more highly educated, less likely to be married, and less likely to be laborers.  We 
also provide means for the relevant outcomes pertaining to workplace bans, SHS exposure, and 
own smoking.  These patterns provide suggestive evidence that local by-laws may have 
improved outcomes: workers in areas with a by-law are more likely to report a work area ban on 
smoking and less likely to report the absence of any workplace smoking restrictions.  Workers in 
areas with local by-laws are also more likely to report zero days of SHS exposure and less likely 
to report daily SHS exposure.  Finally, workers in areas with local by-laws have lower own-
smoking rates than workers in areas without such by-laws.  We investigate whether these mean 
differences in outcomes survive regression adjustment and controls for unobserved area 
heterogeneity in our regression models below. 
An important first step in evaluating the effectiveness of local smoking by-laws in 
Ontario is showing that they affected respondents’ reports of smoking restrictions at their place 
of work.  Indeed, a key goal of our research is to provide evidence on the underlying 
mechanisms through which local ordinances affect actual adoption of workplace bans.  If the 
local laws did not affect worker reports of ban presence – due, for example, to noncompliance – 
then our research design would have little power to answer questions regarding the effects of 
these laws on other outcomes such as SHS exposure (distinct from reported ban presence) and 
own smoking behavior.  We address this first question in Table 2, which shows the LPM 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 Moreover, it is not always the case that the same respondents were asked about both workplace bans and SHS 
exposure.   As such, we also estimate the SHS exposure models on the sample of all individuals who were asked the 
SHS exposure questions, again assuming that the effect of local by-laws on ban presence is constant. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 15  
 
estimates of the effects of local smoking by-laws on reported ban presence over the period 1997-
2004. 
The format of Table 2 is as follows: we present OLS results for the likelihood of 
reporting a complete ban on smoking in one’s work area in the top panel, results for an index of 
smoking restrictions called Ban Range in the middle panel, and results for the likelihood of 
reporting that smoking is allowed anywhere at work (i.e. no restriction) in the bottom panel.  In 
Column 1 we report results from the model that includes demographic controls, year fixed 
effects, and county fixed effects for the full sample.  Columns 2 and 3 perform the same exercise 
for the subsample of males and females, respectively. 
The estimates in Table 2 provide evidence that the local restrictions represent a true 
“program”: local smoking by-laws are associated with a statistically significant increase in the 
likelihood an individual reports a work-area smoking ban in the full sample.  Relative to a pre-
reform mean of .70, our results suggest that local by-laws increase ban presence in the aggregate 
by about 5.5 percent.
15  The middle panel presents results for the Ban Range outcome and again 
provides evidence of a significant increase in workplace bans associated with local by-laws; 
finally, in the bottom panel we find that a local by-law significantly reduces the likelihood that 
an individual reports that “smoking is allowed anywhere” at work by about 2.4 percentage 
points.  In Columns 2 and 3 we confirm the pattern in previous research (Chaloupka 1992) that 
there are sex-differences in the responsiveness to clean indoor air laws.  Stratifying the sample 
by sex shows that these increases in ban presence are driven mostly by males – all of the bylaw 
estimates for males are larger than the full sample estimate and highly significant.  In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 The sample includes only those respondents with valid responses to the workplace smoking ban question (i.e. the 
sample excludes nonworkers), though sample characteristics for the full sample were very similar. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 16  
 
estimates for females in the rightmost columns are much smaller, wrong-signed, and always 
insignificant. 
In Table 3 we further investigate the nature of relationship between local by-laws and 
workplace smoking policies.  Specifically, we stratify the sample into two broad types of 
occupations: blue collar workers (Column 1) and other workers (Column 2) – including 
professionals, administrative workers, clerical workers, and sales workers – which we defined 
using the broad occupation code available in the CAMH monitor data.  Blue collar workers have 
been previously identified in public health research as being at especially high risk for SHS 
exposure (Gerlach et al. 1997 and others).
16 
What is first apparent from Table 3 is that mean outcomes in the pre-reform period were 
consistently worse for blue collar workers in comparison to other workers: laborers were over 20 
percentage points less likely to report a work area ban and over 5 times more likely to report the 
absence of any worksite smoking restriction in the pre-reform period.  Moreover, the estimated 
effect of the local workplace by-laws in Column 1 of Table 3 is consistently large and 
statistically significant with respect to all three workplace ban outcomes.  This is particularly true 
for the extensive margin in the bottom row: adoption of a local by-law in Ontario reduced the 
likelihood of reporting that smoking is allowed anywhere at work by over 50 percent.  This result 
is supported visually in Figure 2, which shows that workplace policies were actually worsening 
among these workers until the period of widespread by-law adoption starting around 2000.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
15 We present an expanded set of coefficient estimates for this model in Appendix Table 1.  The control variables 
entered as predicted: there is an increasing trend in ban presence over time, males are less likely to work at sites that 
ban smoking, as are more highly educated workers. 
16 While food service workers have also been shown to have heightened risk, there are simply too few of these types 
of workers to provide a meaningful analysis using the CAMH monitor data.  There are only 139 workers who could 
arguably be classified as “food service” workers (e.g. bartenders, waiters/waitresses, cooks, kitchen helpers, etc.) in 
the CAMH monitor over this entire time period.  A model predicting the presence of a workplace smoking ban 
returned a large positive coefficient on the local by-law indicator indicating an increase of about 35 percentage How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 17  
 
also find a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of reporting a work area smoking 
ban on the order of 20 percent (top panel), and the results on the ban range index (middle panel) 
are similarly positive and statistically significant.  For non-blue collar workers in Column 2 we 
find no evidence that local by-laws improved any of the measures of ban presence: all of the 
estimates for these other workers are small and statistically insignificant. 
The results in Table 3 therefore demonstrate that local smoking by-laws largely leveled 
the playing field between white collar and blue collar workers by inducing worksites such as 
factories and warehouses to adopt a workplace smoking policy.  This is also apparent in the raw 
trends in outcomes presented in Figure 4, which shows that the gap in work area bans just before 
the main period of local by-law adoption (2000-2004) was well over 30 percentage points but 
fell to just around ten percentage points by the end of the sample period during a time of 
widespread local by-law adoption. 
In Table 4 we investigate the robustness of the result that local by-laws in Ontario 
increased reported ban presence by laborers.  Like the previous tables, the top panel of Table 4 
reports results for the work area ban outcome, the middle panel reports results on the ban range 
outcome, and the bottom panel reports estimates for the “no work restrictions” indicator.  In 
Column 1 of Table 4 we present models that exclude residents from the regional municipalities 
(aka counties) surrounding Toronto (York, Peel, and Durham).  These workers may be 
differentially likely to commute into Toronto for work; as such, excluding residents of the areas 
surrounding Toronto may alleviate concerns about the work/home slippage described above.  
Doing so returns estimates that are very similar to the baseline (all by-law coefficients are large 
and significant), providing suggestive evidence that work/home slippage is unlikely to bias our 
                                                                                                                                                             
points (a 75% increase relative to pre-reform levels), but the estimate was only statistically significant at the 10 
percent level.  These results are available upon request. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 18  
 
estimates of the effect of workplace by-laws.  In Column 2 we report results from a model where 
we only controlled for county level by-laws, ignoring the many small towns and even major 
cities (such as Windsor) at the sub-county level that adopted workplace by-laws.  Although we 
have no reason to believe that the sub-county by-laws were not binding – indeed, this is a key 
reason we are interested in sub-provincial policies in the first place – doing so may permit a 
cleaner interpretation of our results with county dummies and alleviates the work/home postal 
code slippage.  Overall, the estimates are little changed and remain statistically significant across 
the three outcomes. 
In Column 3 we restrict attention to individuals whose county or postal code of residence 
indicates that they live in a place that ever adopted a local by-law over the sample period.   
Ensuring that the treatment effect estimate is driven by individuals in these “changer” 
communities is a standard robustness exercise, and the estimates in Column 3 confirm that the 
main results are not driven by worse outcomes in “control” areas when by-laws are adopted.  
Column 4 reports results from a model that restricts attention to the period of widespread by-law 
adoption (2000-2004) and returns larger estimates than the baseline that remain highly 
significant.  Finally, in Column 5 we allow for county-specific linear time trends in addition to 
county fixed effects.  This is a common way to account for unobserved area-specific 
characteristics that are likely to trend smoothly over time, such as anti-smoking sentiment 
(Friedberg 1998).  Again, all of our main results are similar in magnitude to the baseline 
estimates and retain statistical significance at standard confidence levels. 
The results of Tables 3 and 4, then, confirm that local workplace smoking by-laws in 
Ontario were most (indeed, only) effective at improving worksite smoking policies among 
workers in blue collar occupations.  Workers in other occupations, in contrast, were much more How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 19  
 
likely to have worked at job sites that restricted smoking (e.g. offices) well before the period of 
local by-law adoption; the local ordinances in Ontario appear not to have been binding for these 
individuals.  This finding provides important information on the plausibility of estimates 
regarding the effects of local by-laws – and by implication workplace smoking bans – on 
outcomes such as SHS exposure and own smoking.  Specifically, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 
suggest that any improvement in outcomes for workers in Ontario over this time period should 
be primarily observed among blue collar workers if they are to be attributed to causal effects of 
smoking bans. 
We present the reduced form evidence on these questions in Table 5, which offers 
estimates on the main SHS exposure and smoking outcome variables of interest separately by 
broad occupational grouping.  The format of Table 5 follows the previous tables, in that each row 
presents a different outcome and each column is a different occupation-specific sample.   
Specifically, we present results pertaining to SHS exposure in the top and second rows, while the 
bottom row presents results for the likelihood of being a current smoker.  Column 1 presents 
results for blue collar workers, Column 2 presents results for other workers, and Column 3 
presents results for retired persons and homemakers (whose smoking behavior should not have 
been directly affected by the local smoking ordinances). 
The results in Column 1 of Table 5 confirm that local smoking by-laws – and by 
implication workplace smoking bans – were effective at improving SHS outcomes for blue collar 
workers.  Specifically, we find in the top row that a local workplace by-law significantly 
increased the likelihood of reporting zero days of SHS exposure at work by 12 percentage points 
for blue collar workers.  Similarly, in the second row of Column 1 we find that a local workplace 
by-law reduced the likelihood of reporting 5 or more days of SHS exposure per week by 11 How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 20  
 
percentage points, again statistically significant at the five percent level.
17  That these observed 
improvements are causal effects of the bans is further supported by the wrong-signed, smaller, 
and/or statistically insignificant estimates on those same SHS exposure outcomes for the other 
(non-blue collar) workers, the group that did not exhibit a substantive relationship between a 
local by-law and reported worksite smoking policy. 
The bottom row of Table 5 presents results for the likelihood of being a current smoker.  
The estimates in Column 1 for blue collar workers provide support for the idea that workplace 
smoking by-laws (and by implication, workplace bans) affected own-smoking behavior.   
Specifically, we find that the probability that blue-collar workers report being a current smoker 
fell by an estimated 4 percentage points when a by-law was adopted (about 11 percent relative to 
the pre-reform mean), with very small and statistically insignificant reductions for other workers 
and non-workers.  The magnitude of the estimated reduction in own smoking is large but not 
implausible.  Regression adjusted single equation estimates, for example, suggested that a 
workplace smoking ban is associated with an 11.3 percentage point reduced likelihood of being a 
current smoker among blue collar workers.  Similarly, working at a site with no restrictions was 
associated with a 17.2 percentage point increased likelihood of being a current smoker.  Evans et 
al. (1999) used a variety of techniques to show that the cross-sectional relationship between 
workplace bans and smoking participation was not subject to an omitted variables bias.  Their 
2SLS estimates (using instruments such as firm size) imply that workplace smoking bans reduce 
smoking participation by a quarter to a third (see their Table 6).  Although our relatively small 
                                                 
17 Note that these large improvements in secondhand smoke exposure also indirectly confirm the results on ban 
presence.  A concern is that local by-laws may simply increase awareness of a smoking restriction by individuals 
who were previously unaware of the actual policy, even in the presence of no changes in actual restrictions.   
Because the secondhand smoke exposure question is very objective, we can be more confident that the observed 
improvements in SHS exposure are real.  Because these improvements are systematically associated with the local 
by-laws, the most straightforward explanation is that the local laws did, in fact, change actual worksite smoking 
policies for blue collar workers. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 21  
 
sample does not permit us to identify a statistically significant 2SLS estimate of the effect of 
smoking bans on own smoking, the implied IV estimate is similar to the single equation result 
and comparable to that found in Evans et al. (2000).  This is further complementary evidence that 
workplace smoking bans do, indeed, reduce smoking.
18 
In Table 6 we subject the blue-collar worker results on SHS exposure and own-smoking 
behavior to the same battery of robustness checks we implemented for the workplace smoking 
ban outcomes.  The columns of Table 6 correspond exactly to those in Table 4, and the top, 
middle, and bottom panels reflect the same outcomes as in Table 5 (no SHS exposure, daily SHS 
exposure, and current smoking behavior, respectively).  The patterns of estimates in Table 6 
confirm that the local smoking by-laws significantly improved SHS exposure outcomes for blue 
collar workers.  With respect to the “no SHS” and “daily SHS” outcomes, we find that all the 
estimates in Columns 1-5 are sizable in magnitude and of the expected sign.  Moreover, 
excluding the areas around Toronto (Column 1), controlling for countywide laws (Column 2), 
and restricting attention to individuals in “changer” communities (Column 3) all return estimates 
that retain statistical significance at the ten percent level or better for both SHS outcomes.  The 
other exercises – considering only the recent time period since 2000 (Column 4) or allowing for 
county specific time trends (Column 5) – continue to support the baseline estimates, though they 
do not retain statistical significance at standard confidence levels.  With respect to current 
smoking behavior in the bottom panel, we find fewer statistically precise effects of the local 
workplace by-laws, though this is not particularly surprising given that the baseline estimate was 
similarly insignificant.  All of these exercises, however, return sizable estimated reductions in 
                                                 
18 In results not reported, we find that the estimated reduction in current smoking rates is largely driven by 
reductions in occasional (but not daily) smoking; since daily smokers are more likely to be addicted (and therefore 
less likely to be sensitive to policy interventions), this further suggests that the estimated reductions in own smoking 
rates for blue collar workers are “real”. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 22  
 
current smoking probability, ranging from 3 to 5.6 percentage points (recall the baseline estimate 
was a 4.2 percentage point reduction in own smoking). 
Some final patterns provide complementary evidence that the estimated effects of the 
local ordinances on smoking behavior are, in fact, real.  Specifically, in Table 7 we present 
estimates from similarly specified models of equation (1) on a set of outcomes that should 
plausibly be unrelated to the local smoking ordinances – and by implication workplace smoking 
bans.  In the top panel of Table 7 we show results for the probability the individual reports 
driving after having consumed at least two drinks in the past 30 days, in the middle panel we 
consider the probability an individual reports fair or poor self-rated general health, and in the 
bottom panel we show estimates for the probability the individual reports that she felt more 
unhappy than usual in the past few weeks.
19  While one could argue that these outcomes could be 
plausibly affected through effects on own smoking behavior, such effects would be indirect and 
should arguably be smaller than the estimated smoking reductions.  If we observed sizable 
improvements in these variables associated with local workplace by-laws, for example, this 
would call into question our estimated improvements on SHS exposure and own-smoking 
outcomes, perhaps suggesting specification error or other unobserved coincident public health 
campaigns. 
We report estimates for these outcomes in Table 7, whose format exactly follows Tables 
4 and 6 with one small change: in Column “0” we report the baseline difference in differences 
estimate.  The overall pattern of estimates in Table 7 strongly suggests that our estimated 
                                                 
19 An important consideration in choosing these “control” outcomes was the time frame of the question.   
Specifically, we restricted attention to outcomes pertaining to current or very recent conditions.  This is why we 
chose, for example, not to consider overall alcohol use – the drinking question was asked using a time window of 
“past year”.  Also, there is more solid evidence on the structural relationships between smoking and drinking 
(certainly when compared to the outcomes we consider here); Picone, Sloan, and Trogdon (2004), for example, find 
that smoking bans reduce alcohol consumption among older individuals, and a large body of work shows drinking 
and smoking to be strongly complementary behaviors. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 23  
 
improvements in SHS and smoking outcomes for blue collar workers are not spurious.   
Specifically, across all the “control” outcomes we consider, the vast majority of estimates on the 
local by-law indicator are substantively zero and never statistically significant.  Moreover, the 
sign of the estimates in the top and bottom rows is not consistent across specifications.  While 
the estimates in the middle panel for the likelihood of reporting fair or poor health all have the 
same sign (positive), this actually suggests worsening health.  These overall patterns of null 
findings for outcomes that should plausibly be further removed from the changes in smoking 
bans induced by the local smoking ordinances provide strong support for our interpretation that 
the local by-laws improved SHS and smoking outcomes for blue collar workers. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Understanding whether and how much state and local smoking ordinances affect SHS exposure 
and own smoking is crucial for a comprehensive evaluation of the costs and benefits of such 
ordinances, particularly since public health benefits are routinely touted as the main motivation 
for these laws.  Unfortunately, most previous research has relied on cross-sectional variation, 
which may reflect unobserved characteristics correlated both with the decision to adopt a ban and 
decisions regarding own smoking and type of workplace.  We have revisited this question using 
detailed outcome data from Ontario, Canada and substantial variation in the timing of adoption 
of over 100 local by-laws over the period 1997-2004.  Our data are particularly attractive 
because – in addition to SHS exposure and own smoking outcomes – we observe the 
respondent’s description of her worksite’s smoking policies.  This allows us to directly estimate 
the underlying “first stage” relationship between local policy adoption and subsequent worksite How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 24  
 
smoking policies.  Previous research has implicitly assumed that these ordinances are binding; 
that is, that all workers are “treated” when bans are adopted. 
  We confirm that local by-laws increase reported ban presence along several different 
dimensions.  This positive relationship survives inclusion of unrestricted county dummies to 
account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  Importantly, however, we demonstrate that 
the aggregate benefits of local by-law adoption with respect to reported ban presence are driven 
entirely by blue collar workers.  Other workers – the vast majority of whom were already 
working at job sites with strict workplace smoking policies well before the period of local by-law 
adoption – experienced no marginal increase in ban presence when local by-laws were adopted.  
While intuitive, this is a new finding in the literature and suggests that recent movements toward 
occupation specific bans in hospitality occupations (including bars and restaurants) may have 
overlooked an important group of workers who would benefit from increased protection. 
  We also demonstrate that the large increases in reported ban presence experienced by 
laborers were associated with significant improvements in health outcomes.  Specifically, we 
estimate that a local workplace by-law reduced the likelihood of reporting daily SHS exposure 
by about 30 percent.  Measured differently, we find that a local by-law increased the likelihood 
of reporting no SHS exposure at work by 25 percent among these workers.  Estimates for own-
smoking behavior confirm that workplace smoking bans reduce own smoking.  Overall, our 
results provide important new insight into the underlying mechanisms through which smoking 
bans improve outcomes.  Future research evaluating the effects of state and province-wide bans 
must take care to account for these pre-existing improvements associated with local by-laws in 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics, CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
Variable  Full Sample  Local By-Law=0  Local By-Law=1 
      
Age  39.2 (.176)  39.2 (.203)  39.1 (.362) 
      
Male  .53 (.007)  .53 (.008)  .54 (.016) 
      
Less than HS  .10 (.004)  .11 (.005)  .05 (.007) 
HS degree  .25 (l.006)  .26 (.007)  .22 (.013) 
Some college  .34 (.007)  .35 (.008)  .31 (.015) 
University degree  .31 (.007)  .28(.008)  .40 (.016) 
      
Married  .66 (.007)  .69 (.008)  .59 (.016) 
Never married  .24 (.007)  .22 (.008)  .30 (.015) 
      
Blue collar worker  .30 (007)  .31 (.008)  .27 (.014) 
Other worker  .70 (.007)  .69 (.008)  .73 (.014) 
      
Work area ban  .74 (.007)  .70 (.008)  .84 (.012) 
Ban range  2.82 (.011)  2.77 (.013)  2.95 (.021) 
No work restrictions  .07 (.004)  .08 (.005)  .04 (.006) 
      
No SHS Exposure  .66 (.009)  .64 (.011)  .69 (.015) 
Daily SHS Exposure  .20 (.008)  .21 (.009)  .17 (.012) 
      
Smoker  .29 (.007)  .30 (.008)  .25 (.014) 
      
N 5917  4620  1297 
Weighted means, workers only.How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 29  
 
Table 2: 
Local By-laws Toughened Workplace Smoking Restrictions 
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
 All  Males  Females 
Work Area Ban     






      
R-Squared .106  .120  .076 
N 5917  2930  2987 
Ban Range     






      
R-Squared .105  .105  .065 
N 5917  2930  2987 
No Work Restriction     






      
R-Squared .057  .061  .034 
N 5917  2930  2987 
Data come from restricted use versions of the 1997-2004 CAMH monitor.  Work area ban is an indicator 
equal to one if smoking is allowed only outside or not at all on company property and zero otherwise.  Ban 
Range is an index where 1 indicates that smoking is allowed anywhere and 4 indicates that smoking is not 
allowed anywhere on company property.  No work restriction is an indicator that equals one if smoking is 
allowed anywhere at work and zero otherwise.  Estimates are from OLS regressions that control for county 
and year fixed effects and demographic characteristics (age, sex, education – 4 categories, and marital 
status – 3 categories).  Standard errors below in parentheses, clustered by county.  Sample excludes 
individuals reporting they don’t know or refused a response to the question about workplace smoking 
restrictions. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 3: 
The Effects are Entirely Driven by Blue-Collar Workers 
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
  CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
  Blue Collar Workers  Other Workers 
Work Area Ban    
Pre-reform mean  .537  .774 
    




    
R-Squared .122  .077 
N 1755  4162 
Ban Range    
Pre-reform mean  2.45  2.92 
    




    
R-Squared .111  .069 
N 1755  4162 
No work restrictions    
Pre-reform mean  .172  .032 
    




    
R-Squared .083  .029 
N 1755  4162 










  Robustness of By-Law Effect on Ban Presence, Blue-Collar Workers   
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 





















Work area ban          










          
R-squared .119  .121  .133  .169  .145 
N 1548  1755  1436  913  1755 
Ban Range          










          
R-squared .106  .110  .124  .158  .128 
N 1548  1755  1436  913  1755 
No Work Restrictions          










          
R-squared .080  .083  .089  .115  .101 
N 1548  1755  1436  913  1755 
See notes to Table 2. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 32  
 
Table 5: 
Local By-laws Reduced SHS Exposure for Blue Collar Workers 
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 Blue  Collar 
Workers 
 
Other Workers  Retired persons & 
Homemakers 
(nonworkers) 
No SHS Exposure     
Pre-reform mean  .474  .719   





      
R-squared .103  .084   
N 1276  3160   
5 or more days SHS Exposure/Week     
Pre-reform mean  .348  .148   





      
R-squared .102  .063   
N 1276  3160   
Current Smoker     
Pre-reform mean  .371  .259  .155 






      
R-squared .091  .066  .058 
N 3297  8013  4363 
See notes to Table 2. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 33  
 
Table 6: 
 Robustness of By-Law Effect on SHS and Smoking Outcomes, Blue-Collar Workers  
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 





















No SHS Exposure          










          
R-squared .105  .103  .111  .125  .144 
N   1137  1276  1041  911 1276 
5 or more days SHS 
Exposure/Week 
        










          
R-squared .100  .101  .106  .126  .141 
N 1137  1276  1041  911  1276 
Current Smoker          










          
R-squared .089  .090  .089  .092  .102 
N 2928  3297  2648  1925  3297 
See notes to Table 2. How Do Workplace Smoking Laws Work?    p. 34  
 
Table 7: 
“Control” Outcomes, Blue-Collar Workers 
Models Include County and Year Fixed Effects 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
  (0) (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 





















Drove in past 30 days 
after drinking 2+ 
drinks (mean=.049) 
         












           
R-squared  .046 .050  .046  .047 .051  .066 
N   3297 2928  3297  2648 1925  3297 
Fair/Poor self rated 
health (mean=.067) 
         












           
R-squared  .040 .045  .040  .039 .059  .060 
N  2347 2087  2347  1880 1923  2347 
Past few weeks feel 
more unhappy than 
usual (mean=.086) 
         












           
R-squared  .046 .046  .047  .045 .036  .073 
N  1929 1719  1929  1541 1505  1929 
See notes to Table 2.  Fair/poor self rated health and unhappiness questions were only asked 1999-2004. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Expanded Set of Coefficient Estimates 
Model is LPM of Work Area Ban with County Fixed Effects, All Adults 
CAMH Monitor 1997-2004 
Variable Estimate 
  
























Previously married  .002 
(.026) 
Never married  -.010 
(.014) 
  
HS degree  .044* 
(.022) 
Some college  .104*** 
(.027) 





Coefficients on county dummies not shown.  See notes to Table 2. 
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Figure 1. 
Map of Ontario County/Regional Municipality/District Boundaries 
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Figure 4. 
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